Two senses for "givenness of consciousness'

Pessi Lyyra

pp. 67-87

A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or "given' to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, "givenness as availability', is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient and suitable for first-order theories of consciousness.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-008-9110-6

Full citation:

Lyyra, P. (2009). Two senses for "givenness of consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1), pp. 67-87.

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