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(2008) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1).
When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can think of it either from a functional standpoint or from a physical standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people's mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking difference between two kinds of states—those that involve phenomenal consciousness and those that do not. Specifically, it appears that ascriptions of states that involve phenomenal consciousness show a special sort of sensitivity to purely physical factors.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y
Full citation:
Knobe, J. , Prinz, J. (2008). Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1), pp. 67-83.
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