The noema revisited
My beginning will also be my ending. I want to consider two examples of noemata that seem to resist adequate description—so much so that they do not yet have names. And yet, paradoxically, they do: Brian Fawcett and the light on this page. I begin and end with their description. First, the one we intend, in both senses of the word, as we read a story and, then, the one meant as we observe the photon detectors in a test of Bell's Theorem. Throughout, my goal is to develop an analysis that can enhance a view of the noema as ontologically the same whether the intentional object is a physical object, a cultural object, a process of reflection, an emotion, an hallucination, an abstract property of an irrational number, an author of a book, or a quantum phenomenon. As Husserl developed in Cartesian Meditations,1 the intentional object plays the role of "transcendental clue" to the multiplicity of conscious processes that bear it within them as the meant object. Through a consideration of my two hard cases I show that these and all objects are intentional ones or noemata, all of which are ontologically similar.
Holmes, R.H. (1992)., The noema revisited: hard cases, in J. Drummond & L. Embree (eds.), The phenomenology of the noema, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 211-226.
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