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(1982) Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Dordrecht, Springer.
"This world, which I now experience as the present world with a perceptual belief that is continually and doubtlessly being confirmed, and which, on the basis of harmonious past experience, I experience as the past world with the indubitable empirical belief of memory — this world need not be more than a transcendental illusion."1 "In truth, there could be nothing real, no world, none ever having been or being now, while I nonetheless experience this [world] with certainty, and completely without doubt."2 What is the meaning of this claim? How does Husserl establish the possibility that the world could be a transcendental illusion? We will consider the question of meaning first.3
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7573-6_6
Full citation:
McKenna, W.R. (1982). Transcendental illusion, in Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 184-220.
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