Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles

In this article we analyze the starting point of the debate motivated by Kant’s embracement of the doctrine of "Transcendental Idealism". This debate, as we propose here, can be considered as the original point in the discussion that structures the further development of German Idealism, that is, the discussion about what should be the true idealist system that preserves the virtues of Kant's Transcendental Idealism but is able to overcome its shortcomings. In order to accomplish this, we study: first, the way in which Kant presents his idealistic position in the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781; second, the objections raised by Garve and Feder in the famous review published in 1782, where they accuse Kant of defending a higher idealism, comparable to Berkeley’s position; third, the reaction of Kant against this objection, reflected in certain passages of the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics and of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason; fourth, the famous objection posed by Jacobi, who expresses the need to abandon Kantian notion of things in themselves and accept solipsism if the kantian philosopher wishes to avoid falling into contradiction; finally, referring to the impact of this last objection and the importance of this debate in the origins of German Idealism, we refer to Fichte’s assessment of the Kantian transcendental idealism and his well known pronouncement of his own Doctrine of science as Kant’s position "well understood".

Full citation: