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(2018) Description of situations, Dordrecht, Springer.
4.1 Bolzano and Frege—The rejection of psychologism in logic—Can there be just "signs of signs"?—Frege's notions of "sense", "reference" and "representation"—Our images of things as psychological—Relativity of any representations: their problematic subjectivity. 4.2 The objectivity of Frege's "thoughts"—Importance of context—Truth-values and verification as conditions of knowledge—True and false judgments. 4.3 Cases of "indirect reference": truth and falsity of our beliefs—Frege on intersubjectivity—The social nature of language—The intrinsic non-truth of our thoughts—Inevitability of admitting a reality in itself that is independent from subjective perspectives—Frege's "third realm": objectivity as non-actual—The bankruptcy of correspondism—Popper, Dummett and Soames on the dangers of metaphysical realism or Platonism—Analytic and synthetic truths: the timelessness of both timeless and temporal thoughts—Pursuing solid epistemic standards not only for context-independent but also for context-dependent knowledge.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-00154-4_4
Full citation:
Venturinha, N. (2018). Reality in itself, in Description of situations, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 27-33.
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