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(2012) Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer.
The only consistent theme to be found in the phenomenological literature on the concept of self is constant disagreement. Husserl begins the discussion by disagreeing with a certain tradition concerning the concept of the ego, and then later comes to disagree with himself. Heidegger challenges the entire tradition, including Husserl, by deconstructing the notions of self, soul, ego, person, etc., although he too reconsiders his analysis. Sartre and Gurwitsch reject the Husserlian analysis and propose an account that is closer to Hume and Buddhist doctrine, while Scheler develops a transcendental account similar to the later Husserl. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, rejects such transcendental accounts and argues for an embodied self. More contemporary debates about the self in phenomenology develop more complex, plural concepts of self. We'll see, however, that throughout all of this disagreement there is one thing that all phenomenologists do agree upon, although this is in disagreement with most philosophers of mind.
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Gallagher, S. (2012). Self and first-person perspective, in Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 122-158.
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