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(1986) An ontology of consciousness, Dordrecht, Springer.
In Chapter II, we saw that it would be ontologically incorrect to reduce the psychic to the physical in the sense of an identity theory, although it is true that the psychic and the physical are inseparable from each other. Thus there is no harm in attempting a purely physiological description of all human behavior—even linguistic, social, and problem-solving behavior. Such a project, however, will still eventually find itself in need of some phenomenology when the time comes to correlate the physiological regularities with conscious events, as discussed in Chapter I.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-0715-2_5
Full citation:
Ellis, R. (1986). Conscious structures, in An ontology of consciousness, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 114-142.
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