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The chapter on schematism in the Critique forms the hinge between the discussion of the Transcendental Deduction and the actual principles themselves although it is also succeeded by an account of the nature of transcendental synthetic judgments in general that emerges on the basis of the treatment of schematism. The first question in treating the chapter on schematism, however, concerns how its purpose is distinct from that of the Transcendental Deduction. This question has persistently troubled philosophers writing on the Critique. Paul Guyer for example argues that it is in the schematism (and the Analytic of Principles) that Kant really provides the deduction of the categories.¹ In a fundamental sense Martin Heidegger agrees with this verdict writing: "the schematism grounds the transcendental deduction, although Kant did not understand schematism in this way" (Heidegger, 1927–8, p. 292). The rationale for this argument in Heidegger's case rests upon his conviction that Kant discovers the solution to the question of the ground of relational connection between substances in something that goes beyond the condition of substantiality and even that of the divine, namely temporality itself.²

DOI: 10.1057/9780230501195_5

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