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(2019) Synthese 196 (3).
Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some theories of structured propositions, but inconsistent with any theory of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1492-y
Full citation:
Georgi, G. (2019). Propositions, representation, and truth. Synthese 196 (3), pp. 1019-1043.
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