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(2018) Synthese 195 (1).
In this paper, I argue that sentences that contain ‘omission’ tokens that appear to function as singular terms are meaningful while maintaining the view that omissions are nothing at all or mere absences. I take omissions to be fictional entities and claim that the way in which sentences about fictional characters are true parallels the way in which sentences about omissions are true. I develop a pragmatic account of fictional reference and argue that my fictionalist account of omissions implies a plausible account of the metaphysics of omissions.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1211-0
Full citation:
Murray, S. (2018). Reference fiction, and omission. Synthese 195 (1), pp. 235-257.
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