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I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that (p)—appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that (p). And thus we can’t sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that (p), a non-propositional view of seeing that (p) is, I argue, perfectly intelligible.

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0259-3

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