238407

(1989) Synthese 81 (1).

A representational account of mutual belief

Robert C. Koons

pp. 21-45

Although the notion of common or mutual belief plays a crucial role in game theory, economics and social philosophy, no thoroughly representational account of it has yet been developed. In this paper, I propose two desiderata for such an account, namely, that it take into account the possibility of inconsistent data without portraying the human mind as logically and mathematically omniscient. I then propose a definition of mutual belief which meets these criteria. This account takes seriously the existence of computational limitations. Finally, I point out that the epistemic ‘logic’ (or theory) needed to make the definition work is subject to the Kaplan/Montague Paradox of the Knower. I argue that this is not a defect of the account, and I discuss briefly the bearing of recent work on the paradox of the Liar upon this problem.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/BF00869343

Full citation:

Koons, R. C. (1989). A representational account of mutual belief. Synthese 81 (1), pp. 21-45.

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