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Critical dialogue between different philosophical positions is as difficult to achieve as it is necessary. One must assume that the positions involved can be given a unified and consistent form of expression, and the whole enterprise presupposes a will to understand so that the discussion does not degenerate into a merely polemical exchange. A consideration of pragmatism, moreover, presents additional problems, first, because the classical representatives of the position, while sharing a core of common convictions, differ considerably in their emphasis and avenue of approach. Peirce's logical concerns play a major role in all of his thought, whereas James had definite reservations about the primacy of logic and laid great stress on direct experience and its interpretation from a psychological standpoint. Dewey's orientation was social and biological and, though like Peirce, he gave a central place to logic, that logic was more a structure of methodology than a formal system. The main consequence of this multiplicity in emphasis is that, although one may intend to be considering "pragmatism" as such, one may find that the focus is really on some dominant idea in one of the pragmatists. The difficulty is not, however, insuperable, especially if we are aware of its existence and are prepared to make the qualifications necessary for avoiding wholesale claims that are apt to be misleading. Secondly, until quite recently, the majority of European critics and interpreters of pragmatism have not been acquainted with more than a very small portion of the primary literature and many of their judgments have been based largely on the vivid and popular slogans of James, notably his reference to the 'success' supposed to be the reward of holding certain beliefs. There existed, moreover, antecedent biases of various sorts so that Horkheimer, for example, could declare that no "philosophical pedigree" at all would be accorded to pragmatism were it not for the fact that Peirce derived his philosophy from Kant! This is a curious criterion indeed, and its consistent application might make philosophical mongrels of us all!

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-6268-2_13

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