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As is well known, Husserl develops his early phenomenological concept of “species” by elaboratinga novel form of abstraction, whichhe calls “ideating” abstraction. This paper traces systematic parallels between the works of Lotze, Bolzano and Husserl in order to gain a better understanding of Husserl’s theory of abstraction and his early conception of species. Two lines of interpretation are central to this paper. The first concerns a critique of the Kantian understanding of “concept” (and thus also of the Kantian understanding of analyticity). The second line of interpretation relates to abstraction itself. In contrast to the British empiricists, all three thinkers understand abstraction as a positive, logical and non-psychological process of bringing about an abstract attribute. Furthermore, we will recognize the importance of Bolzano’s syntactic structure of representations (Vorstellungen) for Husserl’s understanding of abstraction in the 2nd Logical Investigation. We will see that Husserl’s “ideating abstraction” depends on syncategorematic forms and cannot be understood detached from a correctly formulated proposition.

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