The philosophical dispute between Brentano and Husserl revolves around the issue of the role, if any, of eidetic analysis in the empirical method of analysis of Brentano’s new science of descriptive psychology of intentional consciousness and its objectivities. Without a proper understanding of this development, however, Husserl’s thinking can be — as it was at the time (and much to his disappointment) — either over-identified with Brentano’s school of descriptive psychology or under-estimated as an advancement on Brentano’s new way of thinking in ‘descriptive psychology’. This paper argues that this dispute that later unfolds between Husserl and Brentano’s respective conceptions of descriptive psychology as a science arises in relation to misunderstanding and understanding properly Husserl’s distinction between eidos and fact and his doctrine of the intuition of essences. This distinguishes Husserl’s new science of descriptive psychology methodologically not only from Brentano but also from his contemporary Dilthey and Heidegger’s development of phenomenology.